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The United States has over forty-one thousand people serving life-
without-parole (LWOP) sentences. It is a phenomenon unparalleled in 
the history of the world. This rise is attributable to a strange 
confluence of (1) the increasing use of LWOP as an alternative to the 
death penalty, (2) abolition of parole by states as part of truth-in-
sentencing reforms, and (3) the rise in mandatory minimum sentences, 
particularly related to sale and distribution of illegal drugs. Nowhere 
has a state or federal government examined the appropriateness of 
LWOP sentences or developed a framework to assess whether an 
offender warrants such a sentence. 
 
Given the historical thoughtlessness of determining who receives this 
serious punishment and the wild increase in such sentences, LWOP 
sentences clearly need reform. This Article attempts to address this 
epidemic by demonstrating the shortcomings of LWOP and proposing 
an alternative sentencing model for serious offenders. 
 
This Article, then, argues for the abolition of LWOP sentences. 
Specifically, the human rights implications of such sentences, the 
speculative nature of such sentences, and the presence of other 
sufficient alternatives provide justification for the abandoning of 
LWOP sentences. Instead, this Article advocates for the adoption of 
presumptive life sentences as an alternative to LWOP. 
 
In Part II, the Article describes the current LWOP crisis. Part III of 
this Article makes the case for abolishing LWOP sentences. Finally, in 
Part IV, the Article proposes the adoption of presumptive life 
sentences as a feasible alternative to LWOP, and demonstrates how 
such sentences can replace LWOP and end the LWOP epidemic. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law and Jessie D. Puckett Lecturer, University of 
Mississippi. D. Phil., Oxford (UK); J.D., Vanderbilt; B.A, Virginia. The author would like 
to thank the following for comments on various iterations and drafts of this article: Carissa 
Hessick, Meghan Ryan, John Stinneford, Lea Johnston, Douglas Berman, Jack Wade 
Nowlin, Stacey Lantagne, Farish Percy, Chad Flanders, and participants at the Southern 
Methodist University Law Criminal Justice Conference. The author would also like to 
thank Nicole Jones for her outstanding research assistance. 
1052 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1052 
II. THE RISE OF LWOP ................................................................... 1057 
A. The Problem of LWOP ........................................................ 1057 
B. Explaining the Rise of LWOP ............................................. 1059 
1. Statutory History ........................................................... 1059 
2. LWOP and the Death Penalty ....................................... 1061 
3. LWOP and Parole Abolition ......................................... 1062 
4. LWOP, Penal Populism, and Mandatory Sentences ..... 1063 
C. Why LWOP Deserves Heightened Scrutiny ........................ 1064 
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR LWOP ABOLITION ................................... 1068 
A. LWOP Sentences Violate Human Rights ............................ 1068 
B. LWOP Sentences Are Cruel and Unusual Punishments ..... 1072 
1. The European Court of Human Rights ......................... 1073 
2. The Evolving Standards of Decency ............................. 1074 
C. The Presence of Reasonable Alternatives ........................... 1079 
1. Time Is on the State’s Side ............................................ 1079 
2. The Limits of Sentencing at Trial .................................. 1080 
IV. PRESUMPTIVE LIFE SENTENCES AS THE LWOP  
ALTERNATIVE ............................................................................ 1081 
A. The Proposal ....................................................................... 1082 
B. Why the Proposal Cures the LWOP Epidemic ................... 1083 
C. The Risks of the Proposal (and Why They Are Worth  
Taking) ................................................................................ 1084 
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1085 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Death is much easier to take than continuing the barren 
and hopeless existence of so-called life in prison.1 
 
Life-without-parole (LWOP)2 is the third rail of criminal punishments.3 
Conservatives take comfort in the existence of a punishment that will allow the 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Christy Chandler, Voluntary Executions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1897, 1898 (1998) 
(citing William Carlsen, State High Court Overturns 2 More Death Sentences, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 24, 1985, at A6 (quoting Robert Lee Massie upon receiving his second 
death sentence, who tried to waive his appeal to “get it over with”)). 
 2 An LWOP sentence means that the sentence of the offender is to die in prison, with 
no possibility of release. LWOP sentences are sometimes called “flat life,” “natural life,” 
or “whole life” sentences. See MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE 
MEANING OF “LIFE”: LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 4 (May 2004), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_meaningoflife.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
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state to lock away evil criminal offenders forever. As Steven Brill explained, 
“I . . . think we’re insanely permissive about murderers. Liberals ought to 
understand that parole for murderers—parole of any kind for any murderers—
is at least as disrespectful of the sanctity of human life as the death penalty is. 
Besides, it’s just plain crazy.”4 
Liberals equally embrace LWOP, but for a different reason—LWOP 
diminishes the use of the death penalty.5 Indeed, since the widespread 
adoption of LWOP in the mid-1990s, the imposition of new capital sentences 
and the number of executions have declined to levels not seen since the 
1970s.6 
But LWOP may be, in some ways, the most serious punishment of all.7 A 
“civil death,”8 an LWOP sentence removes all hope for life outside of prison 
                                                                                                                     
7633-4SZB]; DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2002). “Death-in-prison” or “a civil death” is perhaps a more 
accurate way of characterizing LWOP sentences. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning 
of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 5 (2010). See generally 
BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014). 
 3 With apologies to social security, the third rail in a railway is the exposed electrical 
conductor that carries high voltage power, and stepping on the third rail usually results in 
electrocution. See, e.g., Electro-Magnetic Railway, U.S. Patent No. 263,132 (filed Aug. 19, 
1880) (Thomas Edison’s third rail patent). Indeed, the third rail seems like a logical 
metaphor when exploring the propriety of criminal sentences with terminal consequences, 
albeit not as sudden. 
 4 Danya W. Blair, A Matter of Life and Death: Why Life Without Parole Should Be a 
Sentencing Option in Texas, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 205 n.66 (1994) (quoting Steven Brill, 
Throw Away the Key, AM. L., July–Aug. 1987, at 3). 
 5 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The 
Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More 
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 158, 175 (2008); Note, A Matter of Life and Death: 
The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1838, 1838 (2006) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. 
 6 See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1838, 1851–52. See generally Year That States 
Adopted Life Without Parole (LWOP) Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 2, 
2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-states-adopted-life-without-parole-lwop-sentencing 
[http://perma.cc/HVP8-94FB] [hereinafter State Adoption of LWOP]. 
 7 See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 71–76 (5th ed. 2009) 
(1764) (arguing that LWOP sentences were harsher than the death penalty); John Stuart 
Mill, Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment Before Parliament (Apr. 21, 1868), 
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Books/Mill/Punishment [http://perma.cc/MT9R-LJL2] (“What 
comparison can there really be, in point of severity, between consigning a man to the short 
pang of a rapid death, and immuring him in a living tomb, there to linger out what may be 
a long life in the hardest and most monotonous toil, without any of its alleviations or 
rewards--debarred from all pleasant sights and sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope, 
except a slight mitigation of bodily restraint, or a small improvement of diet?”); see also 
Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted Punishment, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1101, 1103 (2013) (discussing Beccaria’s and Mill’s views about the death penalty 
and life without parole, and citing both). 
 8 O’Hear, supra note 2, at 5. 
1054 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:5 
for the criminal offender.9 It is a communication from society that one is 
irredeemable, because one either deserves death in prison or has no hope for 
change.10 This eternal banishment means that the offender must simply wait to 
die.11 
For some, an LWOP sentence is worse than a death sentence, as death 
sentences at least mark an anticipated end to suffering.12 The large number of 
“volunteers” for executions—death row inmates who waive their appeals to 
accelerate their execution date—supports this notion that life in prison is 
worse than death.13 
The psychological suffering that often accompanies LWOP sentences is 
not surprising.14 The absence of external human contact, both physical and 
emotional, weighs heavily on many offenders. In some cases, such isolation 
causes permanent psychological damage.15 This is particularly true when 
LWOP offenders spend significant amounts of time in solitary confinement.16 
In any event, the current use of LWOP by the United States is 
unprecedented in the history of the world.17 Without a doubt, it is a growing 
epidemic, with the number of LWOP sentences tripling from 12,453 in 1992 to 
                                                                                                                     
 9 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944, 947 (Nev. 1989). 
 10 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (“By denying the defendant the right to 
reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value 
and place in society.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Catherine Appleton & Bent Grøver, The Pros and Cons of Life Without 
Parole, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 611 (2007) (“[Life without parole] removes any 
prospect of reward for change and is therefore fundamentally inhumane. If society is going 
to announce baldly that we don’t care what you do, we don’t care what programmes you 
engage in, you’re never going to be released, it’s the equivalent of providing a death 
sentence.”). 
 12 See Mary Pat Treuthart et al., Mitigation Evidence and Capital Cases in 
Washington: Proposals for Change, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 241, 268 (2002). 
 13 Indeed, a “remarkable 123 prisoners—11% of the 1,099 executions carried out 
[through the end of 2008]—have dropped their appeals and allowed themselves to be 
killed.” Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole, America’s 
Other Death Penalty, 88 PRISON J. 328, 333 (2008), http://www.realcostofprisons.org/ 
materials/americas_other_death_penalty.pdf [http://perma.cc/W2RU-SALR]. 
 14 Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole 
on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 712 n.143 (1998) (citing cases where inmates 
preferred death sentences to terms of life in prison); see also Welsh S. White, Defendants 
Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 855–61 (1987). 
 15 Johnson & McGunigall-Smith, supra note 13, at 336. 
 16 See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, Half a Life in Solitary: How Colorado Made a Young 
Man Insane, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/ 
11/half-a-life-in-solitary-how-colorado-made-a-young-man-insane/281306/ [http://perma.cc/ 
693A-W49F]. 
 17 See Nicole Flatow, One in Nine U.S. Prisoners Are Serving Life Sentences, Report 
Finds, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/09/19/2645 
781/prisoners-serving-life-sentences/ [http://perma.cc/77RL-SDML]. 
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over 41,000 presently.18 In some states, LWOP sentences comprise more than 
five percent of the prison population.19 And many of the individuals serving 
LWOP sentences did not commit violent crimes.20 
As with many problems in our legal system, the LWOP epidemic resulted 
from a confluence of different events.21 It certainly is not the product of any 
intentional or thoughtful legislative design. 
Three factors are primarily responsible. First, beginning in the mid-1980s, 
the war on drugs and the rise of penal populism began a trend resulting in the 
adoption of harsher sentences, including LWOP sentences.22 As a result, many 
states adopted LWOP as a sentencing option in the 1990s.23 
As part of this move to harsher punishments, some states and the federal 
government have also adopted mandatory LWOP sentences.24 An 
overwhelming majority of states—thirty-seven—use mandatory LWOP 
sentences for some crimes.25 
Second, the truth-in-sentencing movement contributed to the increase in 
LWOP sentences.26 Specifically, the perception that offenders served 
                                                                                                                     
 18 ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE 
EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 7 (July 2009), http://sentencing 
project.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_NoExitSept2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/A7S2-
6CEH]; Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole 
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 27 (2010). 
 19 Nellis, supra note 18, at 28. 
 20 See, e.g., ACLU, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT 
OFFENSES 2 (Nov. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/111813-lwop-complete-
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/6KW2-VHUT]. 
 21 See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE 
OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 3–4 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ 
inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/24HQ-NTN8]; Flatow, supra note 
17, at para. 5; Mike Riggs, The Dramatic Rise of Life Without Parole, in 3 Charts, 
ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2013/09/1-9-american-
prisoners-has-been-sentenced-die-behind-bars/6944/ [http://perma.cc/FB53-CMQA]. 
 22 See ACLU, supra note 20, at 33. 
 23 See State Adoption of LWOP, supra note 6. 
 24 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/ 
report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminal-justice-system [http://perma.cc/ 
8QA5-5GR3] (“Statutes carrying mandatory minimum penalties have increased in number, 
apply to more offense conduct, require longer terms, and are used more often than they 
were 20 years ago. These changes have occurred amid other systemic changes to the 
federal criminal justice system, . . . [including] expanded federalization of criminal law, 
increased size and changes in the composition of the federal criminal docket, high rates of 
imposition of sentences of imprisonment, and increasing average sentence 
lengths. . . . [T]he changes to mandatory minimum penalties and these co-occurring 
systemic changes have combined to increase the federal prison population significantly.”). 
 25 Id.; see Nellis, supra note 18, at 27. 
 26 See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 
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significantly less time than the length of their sentences because of lenient 
parole boards resulted in many states abolishing parole.27 Life sentences, 
formerly fifteen-year sentences in many cases, became LWOP sentences, 
leading to a boom in LWOP sentences.28 
Third, the adoption of LWOP sentences in the 1990s resulted in its 
juxtaposition with the death penalty in many cases, providing a logical 
alternative.29 Because LWOP sentences did not result in executions, many 
states made this sentence the only alternative sentencing option for offenders 
convicted of capital crimes.30 
Given the historical thoughtlessness of determining who receives this 
serious punishment and the wild increase in such sentences, LWOP sentences 
clearly need reform. Moving onto this “third rail,” this Article attempts to fill 
that void by exploring the shortcomings of LWOP and proposing an 
alternative sentencing model for serious offenders. 
This Article, then, argues for the abolition of LWOP sentences. 
Specifically, the human rights implications of such sentences, the speculative 
nature of such sentences, and the presence of other alternatives provide 
justification for the abandoning of LWOP. Further, to fill the void left by the 
abolition of LWOP, this Article advocates for the adoption of presumptive life 
sentences as an alternative to LWOP. 
In Part II, the Article describes the current LWOP crisis. Part III of this 
Article makes the case for abolishing LWOP sentences. Finally, in Part IV, the 
Article proposes the adoption of presumptive life sentences as a feasible 
alternative to life without parole, and demonstrates how such sentences can 
replace LWOP and end the LWOP epidemic. 
                                                                                                                     
13–14 (Jan. 1999), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?rep=rep1&type=pdf&doi 
=10.1.1.160.1569 [http://perma.cc/A3W4-3XVR]. 
 27 See, e.g., TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990–2000, at 2 (Oct. 2001), 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/tsp00.pdf [http://perma.cc/862S-TA7P]. 
 28 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE POLICY CTR., RESEARCH 
REPORT: THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ 
SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 10 (Apr. 2002); Susan Turner et al., 
The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, 
State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 76 (1999). 
 29 See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1838. 
 30 Indeed, twenty-seven states have mandatory LWOP sentences for at least one 
crime. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR LAW & GLOBAL 
JUSTICE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 22 
(May 2012), http://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
D6UD-88MQ]. 
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II. THE RISE OF LWOP 
A. The Problem of LWOP 
The imposition of an LWOP sentence expresses one of two different 
sentiments.31 First, from a retributive perspective, it communicates that the 
offender’s crime warrants death in prison because of his culpability and the 
harm he inflicted.32 Second, from a utilitarian perspective, it communicates the 
determination that the offender is irredeemable, and can never be fit to rejoin 
society.33 For one or both of these reasons, the state condemns him to die in 
prison.34 
In imposing such a sentence, the court makes a one-time decision that, for 
the offender, has lifelong significance. Courts rarely, if ever, revisit LWOP 
sentences.35 Indeed, the assumption of an LWOP sentence is that the state has 
nothing further to consider with respect to the offender, save providing for a 
cell, food, and limited health care.36 
In making these kinds of decisions—that the offender deserves to die in 
prison and will never be suitable to rejoin society—courts often rely heavily 
on an assessment of the offender’s criminal behavior.37 These assessments 
typically do not phrase their inquiry in terms of mental health, likelihood for 
rehabilitation, or other mitigating factors.38 
Most importantly, the court’s decision forecloses any future consideration 
of the offender as a person.39 It is the harsh nature of this snapshot decision—
that at this particular point in time there is no hope for redemption—coupled 
with its severe consequence—death in a prison cell—that warrants further 
scrutiny.40 
On some level, it seems presumptuous to judge the future capability of a 
person to find some sort of personal redemption and ability to improve his 
behavior to an acceptable level. Perhaps some crimes, the most heinous and 
brutal, indicate that an offender is beyond redemption, but those must be 
                                                                                                                     
 31 See Appleton & Grøver, supra note 11, at 603. 
 32 See id. at 605. 
 33 See id. at 603–04. 
 34 See id. at 603. 
 35 This is unlike capital cases, where the reversal rate is almost seventy percent. See 
Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death 
Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 260 (2004). 
 36 See Appleton & Grøver, supra note 11, at 611. 
 37 See id. at 610–11. 
 38 See Nellis, supra note 18, at 30. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See, e.g., Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 324 (holding that 
LWOP sentences violate human rights); Appleton & Grøver, supra note 11, at 612. 
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few.41 Assessing the human capacity for personal growth and change in a 
particular situation is certainly a speculative science at best.42 
Even worse, courts make these decisions about the offender’s potential for 
redemption in the shadow of the crime he committed.43 The emotional reaction 
to the harm caused by the offender often denies him, perhaps properly, any 
sympathies of the court.44 Instead, courts sometimes make such sentencing 
decisions in the heat of the moment and the presence of the victims, making 
careful consideration of the future prospects of the offender all the more 
difficult.45 
And often, courts do not even get to make such decisions. Many LWOP 
sentences are mandatory, which means that the legislature decides the sentence 
without respect to the character of the individual person at all.46 If society is to 
declare a citizen irredeemable, it seems particularly unfair that the citizen has 
no opportunity to challenge the imposition of the sentence or speak to its 
merits.47 The automatic nature of mandatory LWOP sentences cheats the 
offender of the opportunity to explain why his life might still have worth to 
society.48 At the very least, such offenders should have an opportunity to plead 
for the mercy of the court.49 
Given both the volume of LWOP sentences and the routine, perfunctory 
nature in which legislatures and courts promulgate these punishments, it is 
unlikely the growing wave of LWOP sentences in the United States will 
subside in the near future without increased awareness of the consequences of 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a 
unique punishment in the United States. . . . [T]hose States that still inflict death reserve it 
for the most heinous crimes.”). 
 42 Compare Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), with Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (both indicating the possibility of juveniles changing over time); 
William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 907 (2010). 
 43 Angela S. Ahola et al., Is Justice Really Blind? Effects of Crime Descriptions, 
Defendant Gender and Appearance, and Legal Practitioner Gender on Sentences and 
Defendant Evaluations in a Mock Trial, 17 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 304, 304–06 
(2010); William Samuel & Elizabeth Moulds, The Effect of Crime Severity on Perceptions 
of Fair Punishment: A California Case Study, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 931, 932–36 
(1986). 
 44 See, e.g., GERALDINE MACKENZIE, HOW JUDGES SENTENCE 13–78 (2005). 
 45 See, e.g., Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim Participation in 
Sentencing on Sentencing Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 453 (1990). 
 46 Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 11, 16 (2003). 
 47 See William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 339, 
345 (2014); John S. Martin, Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312–13 (2004). 
 48 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
199, 210–11 (1993). 
 49 See Berry, supra note 47, at 329–30. 
2015] LIFE-WITH-HOPE SENTENCING 1059 
such sentences.50 To the contrary, the political support on both sides of the 
political spectrum for LWOP suggests that status quo will not change anytime 
soon.51 
B. Explaining the Rise of LWOP 
1. Statutory History 
Prior to the late 1980s, LWOP sentences were not common in the United 
States. In 1992, a mere 12,000 offenders were serving LWOP sentences in 
America.52 This number grew to 33,000 by 2003, and to over 41,000 by 
2008.53 As indicated above, three distinct phenomena explain this rise in 
LWOP sentences: (1) the abolition of parole and embrace of truth-in-
sentencing laws, (2) the increase in mandatory sentences, and (3) the 
increasing view of LWOP as the alternative to capital sentences.54 
Broadly, this rise is part and parcel of the shift in American criminal 
justice policy from the penal welfarism model of the 1960s and early 1970s to 
the penal populism model of the 1980s and 1990s.55 With the rise of crime in 
the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, the penal model shifted from one 
focused on rehabilitation to one enraptured with retribution and 
incapacitation.56 
The rhetoric and ensuing actions of politicians in the tough-on-crime era 
of penal populism made several fundamental changes to criminal sentencing 
processes that resulted in an explosion of inmates, including the expansion of 
LWOP.57 At the forefront of these changes were the abolition of parole and 
increase in truth-in-sentencing statutes, and the widespread adoption of 
mandatory minimum sentences.58 
Indeed, one significant step in the rise of LWOP sentences was Congress’ 
adoption of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.59 This Act, which went into 
effect in 1987, abolished parole for those sentenced under the newly adopted 
                                                                                                                     
 50 See generally LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles 
J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012). But see O’Hear, supra note 2, at 1. 
 51 See O’Hear, supra note 2, at 3. 
 52 See NELLIS & KING, supra note 18, at 10. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See supra Part I. 
 55 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER 
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 27–74 (2001). 
 56 Id.; Tim Newburn & Trevor Jones, Symbolic Politics and Penal Populism: The 
Long Shadow of Willie Horton, 1 CRIME MEDIA CULTURE 72, 73 (2005). 
 57 GARLAND, supra note 55, at 53–74; Mike Hough, Populism and Punitive Penal 
Policy, 49 CRIM. JUSTICE MATTERS 4, 4 (2002). 
 58 GARLAND, supra note 55, at 53–74. 
 59 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
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federal sentencing guidelines.60 Less than a decade earlier, Congress had 
reduced parole eligibility for federal life sentences to ten years.61 Under the 
Act, however, all federal life sentences imposed beginning in 1976 became 
LWOP sentences. 
But it was not just the federal government that followed this path. By 
2000, sixteen states had abolished discretionary parole for all crimes.62 In 
addition, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had adopted the 
federal truth-in-sentencing standard that required violent offenders to serve 
eighty-five percent of their sentences.63 
The consequence in many states of these reforms was to change the 
definition of a life sentence.64 Prior to the move towards penal populism, a life 
sentence often meant that an offender served between fifteen and twenty years 
with the possibility of parole after that time.65 By abolishing parole, states 
turned these sentences into LWOP sentences.66 
Certainly, it was the intention of the politicians to prevent dangerous 
offenders from receiving parole and committing additional offenses, 
particularly violent ones.67 To the extent that the narrative of the penal 
populists was true and parole board leniency filled society with dangerous 
offenders who were contributing to increased crime rates, these reforms 
directly addressed that issue.68 The reality, though, was a shift from one 
extreme to another, moving from a perceived leniency to a punitive harshness 
exceeding that which the world had ever seen.69 
Nowhere did legislatures systematically consider whether individual 
crimes deserved LWOP sentences.70 Unlike the death penalty statutes, which 
were a product of careful legislative determination after Furman v. Georgia, 
                                                                                                                     
 60 Id.; William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give 
Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 640 (2008). 
 61 See Lerner, supra note 7, at 1115; Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1840. 
 62 See HUGHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 1. 
 63 See id. at 3. Violent offenses, as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Reports, include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault. Id. 
 64 See Nellis, supra note 18, at 27–28; Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1841–43. 
 65 See NELLIS & KING, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Peter J. Benekos, Public Policy and Sentencing Reform: The Politics of 
Corrections, 56 FED. PROB. 4, 6 (1992); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH & KATHLEEN J. 
HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM, OR ABOLITION? 13–24 
(1979). 
 68 Robert P. Crouch, Jr., Uncertain Guideposts on the Road to Criminal Justice 
Reform: Parole Abolition and Truth-in-Sentencing, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 419, 422–23 
(1995). 
 69 Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing 
Parole: The Long-Term Impacts on Prison and Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 122–23 
(1996). 
 70 See Crouch, supra note 68, at 420–21. 
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the life statutes that remained after the abolition of parole in many states did 
not receive legislative attention.71 
2. LWOP and the Death Penalty 
Another reason for the proliferation of LWOP sentences in the United 
States has been the use of LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty. With 
dangerousness being a central consideration in capital cases for two decades 
after Furman, the sentencing decision in capital cases became one between 
death and possible parole after fifteen years.72 
When LWOP became a more widespread sentencing option in the late 
1990s, the sentencing calculus in capital cases changed.73 Instead of choosing 
between a death sentence and fifteen years with possible parole, the choice 
became between death and LWOP—another kind of death sentence.74 As a 
result, death penalty sentences steadily decreased over the next decade.75 With 
an LWOP sentence, juries began to realize that the offender would never live 
outside of state custody.76 Whether the death of the offender in prison was by 
lethal injection or by natural causes became less important.77 LWOP sentences 
thus increasingly allowed jurors skeptical of the death penalty to have a clean 
conscience in not having chosen execution.78 
As David Garland has explained in his recent book, Peculiar Institution, 
the culture surrounding the use of capital punishment in the United States has 
shifted drastically over the last fifty years.79 Once a public exhibition which 
citizens travelled from miles around to witness, modern executions have 
become secret, medical procedures that occur in the middle of the night away 
from public sight.80 Garland argues that this shift reflects the growing 
queasiness and uncertainty Americans have about the idea of the state 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2007). 
See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 72 Berry, supra note 42, at 893; John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in 
Capital Cases: Always “At Issue,” 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2001). 
 73 William W. Berry III, Ending the Death Lottery: A Case Study of Ohio’s Broken 
Proportionality Review, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 67, 80 (2015); Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 
1850. 
 74 Berry, supra note 73, at 80–81. 
 75 See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1845. 
 76 See id. at 1844–45. But see Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of 
Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 373 (2001) (arguing that initially jurors had trouble 
believing LWOP sentences meant no possibility of release). 
 77 See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN 
AGE OF ABOLITION 52 (2010). 
 78 Id.; Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria on Executions, 33 CONN. 
L. REV. 845, 855 (2001). 
 79 See GARLAND, supra note 77, at 52. 
 80 Id.; Patricia Ewick, Punishment, Power, and Justice, in 1 JUSTICE AND POWER IN 
SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 36, 45, 49 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998). 
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executing criminals.81 Despite the many who advocate for executions, most 
still prefer the actual execution to remain out of sight and out of mind.82 
Public opinion polls reflect this reality. Recent polls demonstrate that 
while around sixty percent of Americans favor capital punishment, this 
number drops to below fifty percent when LWOP is also an option.83 The 
concern, then, seems to be keeping society safe from dangerous offenders as 
opposed to making spectacles of punishing them by using the death penalty.84 
The popularity of LWOP as a sentencing alternative to the death penalty 
has grown such that in some jurisdictions, it is the only sentencing alternative 
to death for aggravated murderers.85 Such sentencing schemes provide the 
community the security that certain offenders will never pose a danger to the 
community again. 
In other jurisdictions, prosecutors use the death penalty as a plea 
bargaining tool to secure LWOP sentences.86 Such an approach allows 
prosecutors to appear tough on crime while avoiding the difficulty and 
expense of a capital trial, much less years of capital appeals.87 
3. LWOP and Parole Abolition 
In addition to the death penalty, the decision of many states and the federal 
government to abolish parole has contributed to the dramatic increase of 
LWOP sentences over the past three decades. Prior to the adoption of LWOP 
sentences, a life sentence in most states meant that the offender had a 
possibility of parole after fifteen years.88 And in most states, that meant a 
likelihood of release after fifteen years, or maybe a few years after that.89 In 
many states, life sentences seldom resulted in an actual life sentence.90 From 
                                                                                                                     
 81 See GARLAND, supra note 77, at 54, 60. 
 82 See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN 
AMERICA (1997). 
 83 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Support for Death Penalty Stable, GALLUP  
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178790/americans-support-death-penalty-
stable.aspx [http://perma.cc/JZH3-J5AC]. 
 84 See Berry, supra note 42, at 893–94; Blume et al., supra note 72, at 397–99. 
 85 See Ashley Nellis, Tinkering with Life: A Look at the Inappropriateness of Life 
Without Parole as an Alternative to the Death Penalty, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439, 446 
(2013). 
 86 See Kent S. Scheidegger, The Death Penalty and Plea Bargaining to Life Sentences 
13 (Criminal Justice Legal Found., Working Paper No. 09–01, 2009), http://www.cjlf.org/ 
publications/papers/wpaper09-01.pdf [http://perma.cc/68AD-S8Y6]. 
 87 This is not an insignificant benefit as the costs of capital trials and appeals far 
outweigh the costs of life imprisonment. Id. 
 88 See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1840 (citing Peter B. Hoffman, History of the 
Federal Parole System: Part 1 (1910–1972), 61 FED. PROBATION 23, 24 (1997)). 
 89 Id.; see also Andrew M. Hladio & Robert J. Taylor, Parole, Probation and Due 
Process, 70 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 168, 169–70 (1999). 
 90 MAUER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 n.3, 4. 
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the perspective of the state legislatures, then, the life sentences were often the 
maximum sentence as part of a broad sentencing range. 
With the abandonment of parole in many jurisdictions, including the 
federal government, the fifteen- to twenty-year life sentence became a death-
in-custody sentence.91 States did not, for the most part, re-examine their 
statutes to assess whether such sentences were appropriate for crimes.92 
Rather, the sentences just became a different kind of sentence.93 
As a result, the abolition of parole was a contributing factor to the steady 
increase in LWOP sentences. This has been most true in Florida, which has 
seen a proliferation of juvenile LWOP sentences among offenders that 
previously might have had the opportunity for parole after fifteen years, but 
for the abolition of parole.94 
4. LWOP, Penal Populism, and Mandatory Sentences 
The abolition of parole is part and parcel of a broader movement from 
penal welfarism to penal populism over the last few decades of the twentieth 
century.95 In the 1960s and 1970s, the primary concern for prisons was the 
rehabilitation of prisoners.96 Dubbed correctional institutions, these facilities 
sought to correct the character deficiency of the offender such that the offender 
could one day rejoin society.97 
As explained above, the high crime rates of the 1970s set the stage for the 
penal populism movement of the 1980s and 1990s, in which retribution and 
incapacitation replaced rehabilitation as the dominant justification for 
imprisonment.98 The culture sought to control offenders through harsh 
punishments that likewise served to protect society from dangerous 
individuals.99 
Politicians of both parties adopted this “tough on crime” mantra.100 As a 
result, a proliferation of new statutes increased criminal penalties for many 
crimes.101 The federal government, for instance, added a recidivist premium 
with the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, making LWOP sentences more 
                                                                                                                     
 91 Id. at 1 n.3. 
 92 See generally Frederick A. Hussey & Stephen P. Lagoy, The Determinate Sentence 
and Its Impact on Parole, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 104 (1983). 
 93 MAUER ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. 
 94 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 64 (2010). 
 95 GARLAND, supra note 55, at 53–55. 
 96 Id. at 34. 
 97 Id. at 34–35. 
 98 Id. at 62. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 13; Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 9, 10–11 (1999). 
 101 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2010); see MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 56–78 (1999). 
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likely for repeat offenders, particularly in drug cases.102 Similarly, states like 
California adopted three strikes laws that imposed life sentences for offenders 
with three felony convictions.103 
The widespread adoption of mandatory minimum sentences also 
contributed to the increase in LWOP sentences.104 On the federal level, the 
recidivist premiums, particularly in drug cases, created many situations where 
the mandatory minimum penalty became an LWOP sentence.105 
On the state level, LWOP can be the product of a mandatory sentence in 
several ways. First, LWOP sentences are the mandatory minimum sentence for 
offenders convicted of aggravated murder.106 Indeed, in twenty-seven states, 
LWOP is mandatory upon conviction for at least one offense.107 
Second, LWOP is mandatory in other states—Alabama, California, 
Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington—for individuals 
convicted of serious habitual offender laws.108 Finally, in six states—Illinois, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota—and the federal 
government, all life sentences are automatically LWOP sentences because 
there is no parole system.109 
C. Why LWOP Deserves Heightened Scrutiny 
Given this perfect storm of events that led to an increase in LWOP 
sentences, the question becomes whether such sentences deserve heightened 
scrutiny, and if so, why such consideration is necessary. An overview of the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment cases demonstrates this need. 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that “death is different,” 
meaning that capital cases deserve heightened scrutiny because of the 
irrevocability and finality of a capital sentence.110 More recently, the Court has 
                                                                                                                     
 102 See GARLAND, supra note 55, at 132–33. 
 103 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
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 104 See Harvard Note, supra note 5, at 1842; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra 
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 105 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 24, at 63. See generally Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
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 107 Id. at 28. 
 108 Id. at 27. 
 109 Id. at 28. 
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Court’s death-is-different capital jurisprudence. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 
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jurisprudence); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections 
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held that “kids are different” and accorded similar scrutiny in cases involving 
juvenile LWOP sentences.111 For all other criminal cases, including adult 
LWOP sentences, the Court has applied its “gross disproportionality” 
standard, which accords almost complete deference to state and federal 
sentencing decisions.112 
As I have argued elsewhere, though, adult LWOP sentences likewise 
deserve some level of heightened scrutiny.113 In Graham v. Florida, the Court 
recognized the similarity of the death penalty and LWOP, explaining: 
As for the punishment, life without parole is “the second most severe 
penalty permitted by law.” It is true that a death sentence is “unique in 
its severity and irrevocability,” yet life without parole sentences share 
some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other 
sentences. The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life 
without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a 
forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic 
liberties without giving hope of restoration . . . .114 
While perhaps not as “different” as the death penalty, life without parole is 
its own kind of different, as it constitutes a decision to sentence an offender to 
death in prison.115 Justice Kennedy has explained that LWOP, like the death 
penalty, “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”116 In 
essence, an LWOP sentence is a death sentence without an execution date.117 
As indicated, a sentence of LWOP is a decision that the life of the offender 
is irredeemable—and thus, no one will revisit the decision to keep the offender 
in custody until his death.118 LWOP sentences and capital sentences thus share 
                                                                                                                     
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
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the reality that one has no legitimate hope of escaping confinement prior to 
death.119 
Further, in certain ways, a sentence of life without parole can be worse 
than a sentence of death.120 A death sentence has an end date, which for some 
may be less traumatic than imprisonment until one dies of natural causes.121 
To the extent that living in prison constitutes suffering, life without parole 
allows for greater suffering, or at least a longer time for suffering.122 As 
mentioned above, one example of the desirability of ending one’s time in 
prison as soon as possible is the prevalence of “volunteers” in capital cases—
individuals who choose to waive their appeals and accelerate their execution 
date.123 
Practically, a sentence of life without parole can also be worse than a death 
sentence in that the possibility of reversal is dramatically less.124 Because 
courts view death as different, capital cases receive far more extensive and 
careful review than LWOP sentences.125 The reversal rate in LWOP cases is 
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far less than in capital cases, and even where error is present, courts are more 
likely to consider it harmless in a LWOP case than in a capital case.126 
In addition to the differentness of LWOP, the current process by which 
states sentence offenders to LWOP fails to ask the proper questions. As 
indicated above, LWOP sentences indicate a decision by the state that the 
offender deserves to die in prison because either the offender’s conduct merits 
such a punishment, because society has determined that the life of the offender 
is irredeemable, or both, with no hope of ever rejoining society. 
From a retributive perspective, then, the Court ought to ask whether the 
harm caused by criminal conduct of the offender and culpability of the 
offender warrant LWOP. Specifically, the retributive question is whether the 
just deserts of the offender must be permanent banishment from society and 
death in prison. 
From a utilitarian perspective, similarly, the question is whether the 
offender is irredeemable, whether the life of the offender can ever have any 
value to society. In sentencing an offender to LWOP, then, a court or jury 
should determine that the offender is someone who can never rejoin society. 
In practice, however, neither the determination of whether the offender 
deserves banishment nor the determination of whether the offender is 
irredeemable enters into the calculus of the judge or jury at sentencing. This is 
because no separate sentencing procedure exists to address either of those 
questions.127 
In capital cases, for instance, the decision to sentence an offender to 
LWOP is in most cases, simply an alternative to a death sentence.128 Many 
states make LWOP a mandatory sentencing alternative, such that a jury 
decision not to award a death sentence in a capital murder case automatically 
results in an LWOP sentence.129 Even when capital juries have the option of 
electing to give an aggravated murderer a life with parole sentence, there is no 
required finding necessary prior to the imposition of LWOP. 
As the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence makes clear, the need for 
consideration of the individualized characteristics of the offender and the 
crime are paramount to the decision to sentence an individual to death.130 The 
imposition of an LWOP sentence, its own type of death penalty, should 
warrant the same kind of scrutiny.131 
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Most decisions to impose LWOP sentences, however, lack an explicit 
individualized sentencing determination.132 This means that the judge or jury 
does not carefully consider whether the sentenced individual deserves 
permanent banishment from society, is irredeemable as a person, or both.133 
Mandatory LWOP sentences create much of this problem, but capital cases 
that do not provide any other alternative to a death sentence than LWOP also 
contribute to the lack of individualized consideration of such offenders.134 
Lumping an offender’s case with a group of legislatively defined “similar” 
cases, whether as a mandatory or discretionary sentence, cheapens the 
humanity of the offender when the stakes are so high.135 If the state decides to 
banish an offender to die in prison, it should be a careful decision considering 
the individual circumstances of the offender, not the result of careless 
categorizations made at an earlier date. 
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR LWOP ABOLITION 
In light of the unfortunate and unprecedented rise of LWOP in the United 
States and its many negative consequences, the need for abolition of LWOP 
becomes apparent. Specifically, the United States should ban LWOP sentences 
because (1) LWOP sentences violate human rights, (2) LWOP sentences are 
cruel and unusual punishments, and (3) reasonable sentencing alternatives to 
LWOP exist. 
A. LWOP Sentences Violate Human Rights 
In many ways, human rights law rests on the concept of human dignity.136 
In the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, for instance, the second 
paragraph equates human rights to human dignity, explaining the charter’s 
goal “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small.”137 Similarly, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.”138 Such provisions are common in international and national 
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documents outlining human rights.139 In the American constitutional context, 
the Supreme Court has explained that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against “cruel and unusual” punishments draws its meaning from the “dignity 
of man.”140 
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s decisions to the contrary,141 
LWOP sentences impinge on the human dignity of the offender.142 Such a 
sentence is a one-time decision that the offender deserves a death-in-custody 
sentence, a complete condemnation of the offender as a person.143 This is 
problematic for two important reasons. It is impossible to say, as a one-time 
judgment, that the length of the sentence satisfies the demands of 
proportionality, particularly as societal assessments of offense gravity and 
offender blameworthiness can shift over the course of a generation.144 Second, 
a one-time sentencing decision does not allow for changes in the offender’s 
rehabilitation or dangerousness over time.145 
Nonetheless for some crimes, society and family members of victims 
might argue that the criminal conduct of the offender deserves just that—
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forfeiture of his humanity—as the punishment commensurate to the 
seriousness of the offender’s transgression.146 From a human rights 
perspective, the saliency of this argument tracks the debate about the morality 
of capital punishment.147 On the one hand, many victims’ rights advocates 
argue that premeditated murder demands that the state take the life of the 
offender, as the act of taking the life of another without adequate justification 
forfeits one’s right to live.148 The answer to that claim is that the state must 
engage in the prohibited act—intentional murder—in order to punish the 
offender.149 In other words, two wrongs do not make a right, and modern 
conceptions of human rights counsel against this brutal response to brutal 
criminal offenses.150 
LWOP sentences are no different. Locking an offender in a cage and 
essentially throwing away the key—condemning them to die in state 
custody—is simply another version of a death sentence.151 It begs the question 
of whether the actions of an offender can justify the state taking away the 
humanity of a person.152 
From a utilitarian perspective, LWOP sentences communicate that the 
offender is irredeemable as a person—that there is no hope for their ability to 
ever rejoin society.153 Such a determination is dehumanizing—there is no hope 
for the offender’s life—and as such, the state has condemned the offender to 
die in a small cage.154 
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Condemnation to die in prison compromises the dignity of the offender, 
not just by foreclosing the opportunity to ever leave state custody, but also by 
eliminating any hope of rejoining society. LWOP sentences, then, are an 
affront to human dignity because they are life without hope sentences. 
The mental consequences of knowing one will never live outside of 
prison, and that one will remain isolated in prison until death by natural causes 
can be significant.155 The LWOP sentence often imposes its own unique form 
of psychological torture on offenders.156 
The physical and emotional reality of LWOP sentences—rooted in their 
hopelessness—rests at the heart of the human rights problem with such 
sentences.157 Studies have demonstrated these consequences, suggesting that 
in many ways these sentences can amount to a form of torture.158 
Keeping an offender in prison until they die might not in itself violate 
human rights. Rather, it is the decision to condemn an individual to such a 
fate, and to decide to never revisit that decision.159 
This second aspect—and perhaps hubris—of deciding at sentencing that 
an offender will never be suitable to rejoin society, deserves such a fate, or 
both—compromises the offender’s human rights.160 As one cannot know the 
future, depriving an offender of the opportunity to repent and reform his 
character violates his human rights.161 Certainly, some offenders may not ever 
deserve to leave state custody, but the possibility for change counsels against 
making that determination a one-time decision, particularly when it occurs in 
the shadow of the crime the offender committed.162 
The human rights of the offender demand a second look,163 and maybe a 
third one, of the decision that the offender is to die in prison.164 In many, 
perhaps most cases, such offenders will remain imprisoned.165 The possibility 
of release, however small, provides the offender with some ray of hope and a 
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strong incentive to pursue a path of self-reflection and change while in 
custody. 
Without the possibility of ever leaving prison, the sentence of the offender 
is essentially a life-without-hope sentence.166 By contrast, if the state accords 
the offender some later re-examination of the life sentence, the sentence 
becomes a life-with-hope sentence. As proposed below, such an approach 
would largely remedy the human rights violation currently perpetuated by 
LWOP sentences throughout the United States. 
Another way that LWOP sentences can violate human rights is in the 
disproportionate nature that many states impose them.167 Where a sentence is 
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, it violates the offender’s 
human rights.168 As South African Constitutional Court Judge Laurie 
Ackermann explains, “To attempt to justify any period of penal incarceration, 
let alone imprisonment for life . . . , without inquiring into the proportionality 
between the offence and the period of imprisonment, is to ignore, if not to 
deny, that which lies at the very heart of human dignity.”169 
As indicated above, LWOP sentences constitute an excessive punishment 
for many criminal offenders.170 This is particularly true for non-violent 
offenders or habitual offenders, where the sentence clearly does not reflect the 
culpability of the offender or the harm caused by the crime.171 
B. LWOP Sentences Are Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Both the statute of the European Court of Human Rights and the United 
States Constitution prohibit cruel and unusual punishments. The European 
Court of Human Rights has recently held that LWOP is a cruel and unusual 
punishment, although it has reconsidered this judgment.172 While the United 
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to reach the same conclusion, a re-
examination of the Court’s evolving standards of decency jurisprudence 
suggests that LWOP might also violate the Eighth Amendment. 
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1. The European Court of Human Rights 
In July 2013, the European Court of Human Rights addressed the issue of 
whole-life sentences in the case of Vinter v. United Kingdom.173 In that case, 
three British nationals challenged their LWOP sentences, arguing that the 
sentences constituted human rights violations.174 
The provision of international human rights law that the court applied was 
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments that tracks the language 
of the Eighth Amendment.175 In other words, the court considered whether 
LWOP was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the human rights of 
the offenders.176 
In Vinter, the court held that LWOP sentences constitute human rights 
violations.177 The court explained that the violation did not occur from the 
sentence itself, but instead from the decision to never revisit the sentence.178 In 
other words, keeping a particular offender imprisoned for the rest of his life 
does not violate his human rights.179 Making a one-time sentencing decision, 
though, that he will die in prison does violate human rights.180 
It is the finality of the sentencing decision and the denial of the possibility 
for revisiting the sentence that results in the human rights depravation.181 
From the court’s perspective, this is true because it is impossible to determine 
that an offender will forever be irredeemable and as such, unfit to rejoin 
society.182 No matter the criminal act, the court found that the human rights of 
an offender accord him the opportunity to have his life sentence reconsidered 
at a later date.183 
In short, sentencing an offender to life without parole violates human 
rights and states can remedy this only by providing for some review at a time 
other than sentencing.184 The court in Vinter did not specify that a particular 
entity perform this review, although clearly the court or a parole board could 
perform this function.185 
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2. The Evolving Standards of Decency 
By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has been unwilling to 
declare that mandatory LWOP sentences constitute a cruel and unusual 
punishment, even for juveniles.186 The initial reluctance to make such a 
determination stems from the Court’s death-penalty focused approach to the 
Eighth Amendment, drawing an artificial line between capital and non-capital 
cases such that non-capital cases never transgress this prohibition no matter 
how disproportionate the sentence.187 This is ironic given that the Court’s first 
two significant Eighth Amendment decisions, Weems v. United States and 
Trop v. Dulles, struck down disproportionate punishments in non-capital 
cases.188 
Recently, the Court has blurred this line in Graham v. Florida and Miller 
v. Alabama by declaring that juvenile LWOP sentences are cruel and unusual 
punishments when imposed as mandatory sentences or in non-homicide 
cases.189 The basis for this distinction, though, has been the unique nature of 
juveniles (“children are different”), not a determination that LWOP, by itself, 
merits further scrutiny.190 
When compared to Vinter, the question becomes whether the Court’s 
willingness to blindly defer to Congress and state legislatures with respect to 
LWOP sentences ignores the human rights of those sentenced to LWOP. As 
the Court explained in Trop v. Dulles, “[t]he basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”191 This sentiment 
suggests that the Court should revisit its prior decisions allowing LWOP 
sentences under the Eighth Amendment.192 
In the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment cases, two steps inform the 
Court’s measurement of the evolving standards of decency that define what 
punishments are cruel and unusual.193 First, the Court considers the objective 
indicia of state legislatures to determine if there is a consensus.194 Then, the 
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Court brings its own judgment to bear, assessing whether the punishment 
satisfies any of the purposes of punishment.195 
As to the first inquiry, if the Court looks only to the sentencing practices 
of the states and the federal government, then LWOP is not a cruel and 
unusual punishment, as forty-nine of fifty states and the federal government 
allow, and in many cases mandate, LWOP sentences.196 
In the past, though, the Court has also looked to worldwide practices to 
determine the content of the evolving standards of decency.197 If the 
determination of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual depends on world 
as opposed to domestic standards, then a different calculus emerges.198 
As with the death penalty, the United States’ use of LWOP places it as an 
outlier among civilized nations.199 International human rights law does not 
directly address LWOP as a sentence, but does require states to ensure that 
“[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential 
aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.”200 
The International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute likewise does not allow 
for LWOP sentences, requiring that life sentences be reviewable after twenty-
five years.201 This is despite the jurisdiction of the ICC including far worse 
crimes than American courts typically consider, including genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.202 The number of signatories to the 
Rome Statute—123 nations, but not the United States—indicates a worldwide 
consensus against the use of LWOP sentences.203 Only thirty-eight of the 
world’s 193 countries allow LWOP sentences.204 
To be sure, the United States’ use of LWOP sentences far exceeds the 
practice of any other Western nation.205 Among European nations, only ten 
allow the imposition of LWOP sentences.206 Further, European nations can 
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refuse extradition of an alleged offender if that offender faces an LWOP 
sentence.207 
The United States’ LWOP population of over 41,000 offenders dwarfs that 
of other countries that permit LWOP.208 The nations with the next highest 
number of LWOP sentences—Australia, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom—collectively have less than 150 offenders serving LWOP 
sentences.209 
Not only is the United States an outlier in the number of offenders serving 
LWOP sentences, but also in the kinds of crimes for which LWOP is a 
permissible sentence.210 Many countries require violent crimes for an LWOP 
sentence, and in some cases repeated violent offenses.211 England, for 
instance, requires premeditated murder of two or more people to be eligible for 
a LWOP sentence.212 
The second part of the evolving standards of decency analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment asks whether any of the purposes of punishment justify the 
punishment in question. As demonstrated below, LWOP sentences do not 
clearly satisfy any of the purposes of punishment. 
The purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation—offer philosophical rationales for particular punishments, but 
do not specify a particular quantum of punishment. Andrew von Hirsch and 
Andrew Ashworth have argued that this is true with just deserts retribution—
one can rank punishments ordinally, but not provide cardinal values.213 In 
other words, one can determine the punishment for one crime should be more 
than another, but certain criminal acts do not demand a specific amount of 
punishment.214 It is difficult to say, for instance, whether an offender who 
commits armed robbery deserves ten years, twenty years, or some other 
punishment.215 
With the most severe crimes, the purposes of punishment then begin to 
collapse, as a range of punishments with different levels of culpability—
compare premeditated murder to genocide—will still warrant the same 
punishment, simply because that is the maximum punishment available.216 
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As a result, the purposes of punishment have diminishing value when 
considering punishments such as LWOP and the death penalty.217 The better 
question is where the punitive ceiling should be.218 Looking at the purposes of 
punishment individually with respect to LWOP underscores this point. 
Given the many different strands of retribution, there are several ways to 
conceptualize an assessment of LWOP. If retribution is merely about revenge, 
it is difficult to imagine that a life sentence would serve to avenge a murder in 
the same way that the death penalty would.219 If, on the other hand, retribution 
is about giving an offender just deserts, LWOP becomes a more palatable 
option.220 Nonetheless, it is difficult to say, no matter the crime, that the 
definitive just deserts sentence is death in prison.221 Again, it depends on how 
one aligns the cardinal value of a sentence with the crime.222 In a non-capital 
jurisdiction, such a determination becomes simply the ceiling for punishments, 
and is not necessarily the prescribed punishment from a just deserts 
perspective.223 
If one adopts a communicative version of just deserts,224 this becomes 
even more complicated, as it is difficult to say that the required metric of 
communication needs to be a death in prison sentence as opposed to some 
other sentence.225 Likewise, if under this approach, retribution may not require 
the death penalty, it is difficult to say that it requires LWOP.226 
With the utilitarian purposes of punishment, LWOP poses similar 
difficulties. As social science studies have shown with regard to capital 
punishment,227 it is unlikely that LWOP has a significant deterrent effect on 
crime.228 This is particularly true because LWOP is the lesser of two 
punishments in capital cases, so that if the death penalty does not deter, it is 
unlikely that LWOP does. 
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As for incapacitation, dangerousness estimates have a high likelihood of 
being inaccurate.229 Many estimates suggest that dangerousness estimates are 
only 50% accurate at best.230 Given the difficulty of determining 
dangerousness, the risk of over and under inclusiveness in sentencing remains 
likely.231 
Likewise with younger offenders, estimating dangerousness creates a 
difficult problem, as the likelihood of some maturation is high.232 Brain 
science demonstrates that complete social and emotional maturity does not 
occur until age twenty-five.233 Most criminal offenders have not reached that 
age.234 It is difficult, then, to measure one’s future dangerousness given the 
uncertainty of physical and emotional development.235 
A further problem is estimating the temporal end to one’s 
dangerousness.236 Surely, most criminal offenders cease to be dangerous once 
reaching a certain elderly age, perhaps as the result of physical or mental 
declines.237 While some offenders may remain dangerous until they die, for 
many it is not likely to be the case.238 The sentencing question then becomes 
when one ceases to be dangerous. 
LWOP sentences based upon dangerousness assume that (1) the offender 
has reached maturation, and (2) the offender will remain dangerous until they 
die, even if they have physical or mental declines. It is easy to see, then, why it 
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is difficult to determine to any level of certainty that a particular offender will 
be dangerous for the rest of his life.239 
Finally, LWOP sentences overtly abandon the utilitarian purpose of 
rehabilitation. By definition, LWOP sentences decide that the level of 
rehabilitation that an offender could receive will never reach a level such that 
the offender can rejoin society. For the LWOP offender, then, rehabilitation 
becomes a moot consideration, at least with respect to the possibility of 
release, which does not exist for such offenders. 
C. The Presence of Reasonable Alternatives 
Even if one does not find that LWOP sentences violate human rights or 
constitute cruel and unusual punishments, it is still worth considering abolition 
because of the presence of reasonable alternatives. As explained below, the 
decision that an offender should spend his life in prison does not have to be a 
one-time decision that will never be revisited. 
1. Time Is on the State’s Side 
In capital cases, the state kills the offender. In such situations, the review 
of the sentence becomes moot, as the offender is dead.240 As a result, states 
attempt to provide exhaustive review of cases prior to execution.241 This 
process often takes over a decade.242 
In LWOP cases, by contrast, the only temporal limitation to examining a 
case is the life span of the offender. In other words, the state has ample time to 
revisit sentencing decisions in such cases. 
The practical impact of this reality, however, is that courts generally 
ignore such cases after the initial sentencing decision because the sentence is 
not a capital one.243 As a result, the LWOP sentences, despite their 
condemnation as death in state custody, seldom receive the kind of scrutiny 
that capital cases do, and are rarely reversed on appeal.244 
Even so, the slow process by which offenders with LWOP sentences serve 
them—until death by natural causes—affords ample time to revisit the 
sentence at a later date to determine whether the state should release the 
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offender. Kicking the final decision down the road does not cost the state 
anything, as it can always decide not to release the offender. On the other 
hand, simply providing an opportunity for revisiting the sentence at a later date 
can mean everything for the offender—providing some hope for release as 
opposed to no hope for release.245 
2. The Limits of Sentencing at Trial 
Determining the appropriate criminal sentence becomes difficult in cases 
toward the more punitive end of the spectrum.246 While in many American 
states the likely sentence for an aggravated murderer is LWOP or the death 
penalty, other countries impose far lesser sentences for the most serious 
crimes.247 In Norway, for example, Anders Breivik went on a killing spree, 
murdering seventy-seven people, but received a sentence of twenty-one years, 
the maximum allowed under Norwegian law.248 
In other words, serious crimes do not mandate certain penalties. For such 
crimes, the top of the permissible sentencing range often becomes the 
applicable sentence. As explained above, the ICC restricts punishments for 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity to life with the possibility 
of parole after twenty-five years.249 
But it is not clear that a certain sentence arises from a certain crime.250 As 
a result, giving the sentence a “second-look” at a later date allows the judge or 
parole board to re-examine the punishment anew.251 This has the advantage of 
having distance from the emotional reaction to the crime that occurs in its 
aftermath. All too often the fury of the response to the offender’s transgression 
pushes the judge or jury to choose the most severe punishment.252 
At the initial time of sentencing, it is difficult to determine what sentence 
is sufficient for such an offender. The court’s attempt to envisage whether the 
offender will ever be capable of rejoining society, particularly after a decade or 
more in state custody, seems to be conjectural at best. 
Engaging in a second or third look at the sentence allows the judge or jury 
to consider the effect to date of the sentence on the offender. Part of this 
analysis is whether the sentence to date has been sufficient to achieve the 
punitive goal. Similarly, this analysis can explore the degree to which the 
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offender has changed or grown during his incarceration, and whether such 
development warrants release. 
The American Law Institute, in the most recent draft of the Model Penal 
Code, has recognized this difficulty.253 In the most recent tentative draft of the 
next version of the code, draft section 305.6 announces principles for 
legislation with respect to long-term prison sentences.254 While not calling for 
abolition of LWOP sentences in all circumstances, as proposed herein,255 the 
Institute does propose giving offenders the opportunity for sentence 
modification after fifteen years.256 The relevant part of its proposal explains: 
Sentence modification under this provision should be viewed as analogous to 
a resentencing in light of present circumstances. The inquiry shall be whether 
the purposes of sentencing in § 1.02(2) would better be served by a modified 
sentence than the prisoner’s completion of the original sentence. The judicial 
panel or other judicial decisionmaker may adopt procedures for the screening 
and dismissal of applications that are unmeritorious on their face under this 
standard.257 
The drafters here clearly express the sentiment that for long-term prison 
sentences (although not LWOP), courts should re-examine the sentence to 
determine whether it deserves some kind of modification.258 
Instead of merely creating a safety valve to modify lengthy sentences, this 
article proposes the abolition of LWOP and articulates below a model for 
creating varying levels of presumptive life sentences. 
IV. PRESUMPTIVE LIFE SENTENCES AS THE LWOP ALTERNATIVE 
Given the shortcomings of LWOP sentences and the need for an 
alternative, this section proposes an alternative to LWOP: presumptive life 
sentences. As discussed below, this proposal aims to cure the LWOP epidemic 
without undermining the capital punishment abolition movement and without 
increasing the volume of dangerous criminals in society. 
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A. The Proposal 
Presumptive life sentences should replace LWOP sentences as the most 
serious alternative to capital punishment. Such sentences would aim to 
bifurcate the sentencing procedure with respect to the most serious felonies 
such that any sentencing decision of such magnitude would receive de novo 
review of its merits. 
Awarded at sentencing, presumptive life sentences would first combine a 
fixed term of years, followed by a second decision about whether the offender 
should serve an additional fixed term of years. 
Second, the decision about whether to sentence the offender to an 
additional term of years would return to the original sentencing court. The 
same court would conduct a sentencing hearing, similar to that after trial, to 
determine the appropriate future sentence.259 
Third, for offenders receiving a presumptive life sentence, the presumption 
at the second sentencing hearing would be that the offender would serve an 
additional term of years. The offender, though, could overcome that 
presumption by demonstrating that he or she deserved to return to society. 
The goal, then, would be to bifurcate the sentencing decision in serious 
criminal cases. The presumption and term of years could relate to the crime 
committed by the offender. Non-violent drug offenders might have a shorter 
term of years and a weaker presumption against an additional term of years. 
Aggravated murderers, on the other hand, would likely have a longer initial 
term of years, and have a higher burden to overcome the presumption of a life 
sentence. 
For instance, a state could develop a system with different tiers of 
presumptive life sentences: non-violent offenders, violent offenders, and the 
“worst of the worst” offenders. For all categories, the second part of the 
sentencing would occur after 15 years. For non-violent offenders, the 
presumption would be that the state would release the offender, with the state 
having the burden to demonstrate that the offender deserved an additional ten-
year term. For violent offenders, the presumption would be that the state 
would not release the offender, and the offender would serve an additional ten-
year term, unless the offender could prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that additional incarceration was unnecessary. For the “worst of the worst” 
offender, the presumption of continued incarceration would be higher, and 
another ten-year sentence would commence unless the offender could 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that additional incarceration 
was unnecessary. 
For all categories of offenders, another sentencing hearing would occur 
after another decade, following the same rules. Under such a system, all 
offenders would have an opportunity for release once a decade, but would 
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have to establish that they deserved release, particularly in the case of violent 
offenders. For the worst offenders, the increased burden would make release 
unlikely, except in rare circumstances. 
B. Why the Proposal Cures the LWOP Epidemic 
Substituting presumptive life sentences for LWOP sentences has the 
potential to cure the LWOP epidemic. First, bifurcating the sentence increases 
the ability to sentence offenders more individually and accurately, rather than 
lumping a large number of offenders into a one-size-fits-all category. This 
approach expands the individualized sentencing ideal expressed in Lockett v. 
Ohio and Woodson v. North Carolina,260 and allows the final sentence to 
include consideration of the offender’s actions and life after imprisonment. For 
some deserving prisoners, this will afford the opportunity at having some 
semblance of a life. 
Second, the bifurcated sentencing approach allows for a determination of 
the offender’s ability to change over time, as the court has an additional data 
point beyond the initial sentencing hearing. It gives the offender a chance to 
show that he deserves to be defined by something more that his worst 
transgression. 
The proposal then eliminates the human rights problem of LWOP—it 
accords all offenders a quantum of human dignity. The presumptive life 
sentences are life-with-hope sentences—providing some opportunity for 
redemption for all offenders. 
As the Court pointed out in Vinter, life imprisonment by itself does not 
violate human rights. Rather, it is the one-time decision, never revisited, that 
compromises the offender’s dignity. By revisiting the sentence once a decade, 
the state takes the life of the offender seriously, and offers hope, albeit narrow 
in some cases, for reform. 
At the same time, presumptive life sentences require the careful review of 
the character and rehabilitation of offenders prior to allowing their release. The 
courts will have the ability to release offenders who are less likely to reoffend, 
while keeping more violent individuals incapacitated. 
Also important is the amount of time between the initial sentence and the 
second part of the hearing. The situation of the offender after fifteen years 
provides a different calculus, particularly given the decreased likelihood of 
recidivism as criminal offenders age.261 Most offenders will be in their mid-
thirties and will have had sufficient opportunity to mature. For older offenders, 
the likelihood of reoffending diminishes significantly among sixty- and 
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seventy-year-old inmates.262 Without a doubt, the decision-making calculus as 
to the need to incarcerate certain offenders shifts over time. This will allow 
courts to make a better judgment as to whether the offender should continue to 
remain behind bars. 
C. The Risks of the Proposal (and Why They Are Worth Taking) 
The most obvious risk of adopting presumptive life sentences and 
abolishing LWOP sentences is that dangerous offenders will rejoin society and 
reoffend, perhaps in brutal and horrific ways. Certainly, such occurrences will 
counsel against this approach and convince many that LWOP provides a better 
solution. 
While real, it is easy to overstate such a risk, particularly based upon the 
fear of offenders. One occurrence does not make a rule—and the court serves 
as a shield against particularly dangerous offenders. 
Further, this fear ignores the diminishing likelihood of widespread crime 
sprees by released offenders, many of whom will be middle-aged, if not 
elderly. In other words, while one can make the case for fearing certain 
offenders in the aftermath of vicious crimes, it seems at some point many 
cease to be so dangerous. 
Further, one must weigh the risk of reoffending, stemming from a culture 
of fear of criminal offenders, against the complete condemnation of the 
criminal offender. The penal populism movement over the past three decades 
in the United States clearly demonstrates the propensity for excessive 
punishment in the name of incapacitation of dangerous offenders. 
The cost of the incarceration state from a moral perspective is the over-
punishment of offenders, particularly those from poor and/or minority 
backgrounds. Labeling such offenders as “criminal others” gives license to 
fear them unreasonably and consequently over-punish them. Eliminating 
LWOP sentences mitigates some of this irrational over-punishment in a 
principled, rational way while still considering the safety of society. 
A second major objection to the adoption of presumptive life sentences 
would be the excess cost of additional judicial proceedings. The fear would be 
that presumptive life cases would turn LWOP cases into the financial drain of 
capital cases. 
On the one hand, the additional scrutiny might achieve significantly more 
justice in the criminal justice system. If a carefully reviewed capital system 
yields an error rate of almost seventy percent in capital cases,263 it is 
unreasonable to assume a vastly different scenario in LWOP cases. Indeed, the 
main difference may be the comparative lack of appellate scrutiny that LWOP 
sentences receive. In addition, LWOP offenders do not have the right to 
appellate counsel, impairing their access to further review of their cases. 
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It is possible, as well, that the release of some offenders, most likely non-
violent offenders, would save the state some of the costs of incarceration 
associated with LWOP. Such savings would likely not completely offset the 
increased costs, but might help to defray them. 
Even if review did not reveal errors and simply served to drive up judicial 
costs, the dignity of the offenders demands such care. The decision to imprison 
an offender for life is not a decision states should take lightly, and reviewing 
the cases once a decade does not seem to be too significant a burden in light of 
the seriousness of the consequence for the offender. 
In the final analysis, neither the risks of releasing dangerous offenders nor 
the increased administrative and legal costs outweigh the human rights of the 
offender. The presumptive life sentence approach advocated here helps assure 
that the state accords criminal offenders a modicum of dignity in the 
administration of criminal justice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has made the case for the abolition of LWOP sentences. After 
explaining the perfect storm that led to this epidemic in the United States, the 
Article demonstrated why such sentences violate the human rights of criminal 
offenders. Having shown the shortcomings of LWOP sentences, the Article 
then proposed an alternative—presumptive life sentences—and explained why 
this alternative would remedy the human rights issue without unduly 
compromising the safety of citizens. 
In the end, this Article simply seeks to provide all criminal offenders some 
level of hope for redemption. To remedy, then, the many faults of LWOP 
sentences—a death sentence that gives no hope—states should replace LWOP 
with life-with-hope sentences in the form of presumptive life sentences. 
